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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Judicial Review in State and Federal Courts-
Determination of Validity of Rules and Regulations Before Their
Application in Specific Cases
Whether or not administrative rules and regulations may be re-
viewed by the courts at the instance of one who is either directly or
indirectly affected by them but to whom they have not been applied is a
question that has not been presented to the courts very often. The
North Carolina Supreme Court considered this question in Duke v.
Shaw1 and decided that the statute under which the plaintiff proceeded
did not give him the right to have the court determine the validity of
these regulations. However, an examination of federal and state
authorities reveals several possible remedies not considered in the North
Carolina case.
In the Duke case the complainant, a hotel operator, filed a petition
for review asking the court to proceed under G.S. §§ 143-306 to -3162
and declare invalid regulations issued by the Commissioner of Revenue
which determined that sales of supplies and equipment to hotels, motels,
and others renting rooms were sales to consumers and therefore subject
to the sales tax. The Commissioner demurred on the ground that the
petition did not state a cause of action since it did not allege the payment
by or assessment of any taxes against the petitioner. The trial court
sustained the demurrer and the supreme court affirmed. In effect the
court held that there could be no judicial review under this statute of
administrative regulations prior to their application in a specific case.
The state law on this point is conflicting. The collected cases involve
"erules," "regulations," "orders," and "resolutions" of administrative
agencies, but the designation is of no importance since the substance is
the same.
Some of the more liberal states have adopted section 6 of the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act.4 That section provides that one
1247 N.C. 236, 100 S.E.2d 506 (1957).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (Supp. 1957). These statutes will be
discussed later herein.
'Cf. North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 224 N.C. 293,
29 S.E.2d 909 (1944), a case decided before the passage of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 143-306 to -316 (Supp. 1957). The supreme court held that the appellants were
not entitled to appeal to the courts from the action of the Commission in adopting
and promulgating an amended rule. The court said that no appeal could be taken
from an order by which the Commission adopts a general regulatory rule of super-
visory nature.
' 9C UrEoRm LAws ANN. 179, 181 (1957).
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may petition for a declaratory judgment as to the validity of any rule
when it appears that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes
with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights
or privileges of the petitioner. Wisconsin,5 California,6 and Missouri7
have adopted this section of the act, and although no Wisconsin case
interpreting the section was found, the Missouri and California courts
have interpreted it liberally."
In Butler v. Rude" the Kansas Supreme Court allowed plaintiff, a
licensed embalmer, to maintain an action to enjoin the State Board of
Embalming from enforcing a rule made by the Board though he alleged
ohly that he was informed that the Board intended to enforce the rule.
The court said that plaintiff was not compelled to await action by the
Board suspending his license, or refusing to issue or renew his license,
in order to test the Board's power to adopt the rule.
The North Dakota Court justified a contrary decision'0 with the
"general rule that an injunction will not be granted to stay criminal
or quiasi-crimifial'proceediihgs'. " In" that case plaintiff prayed that
an order of the Board fixing a schedule of minimum prices be declared
void and' that the Board be enjoined from enforcing or attempting to
enforce the order. The statute under which the Board acted gave it
power" to issue rules, orders, etc. with criminal sanctions. The court
said that plaintiff, had an adequate remedy at law since he could use
the alle'ged invalidity of the order as a defense to any prosecution against
him uider the act.
In Zangerle v. Evatt12 the Ohio court declined to review at the in-
stance of county auditors a rule for the classification of property used
in the refining of petroleum. The Tax Commissioner had adopted the
rule and the plaintiffs had had it reviewed by the Board of Tax Appeals.
"Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.05 (1955). CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11440 (1955).
'Mo. ANN . ST'AT. § 536.050 (Vernon 1953).
8 Harney v: Contractor's State License Bd., 39 Cal. 2d 561, 247 P.2d 913 (1952).
Plaintiff, an engineering contractor, sought a declaratory judgment as to the validity
of a regulation of the Contractor's State License Board requiring a separate license
for each of thirty-one different classes of specialty work. The court held that,
under the statute, the allegation was sufficient to allow plaintiff to contest the
regulation. For a discussion of the case and code sections involved see Note, 41
CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1953). See also Knudsen Creamery Co. v. Brock, 37 Cal. 2d
485, 234 P.2d 26 (1951).
In King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W.2d 547 (1947), plaintiffs joined a
union-in violation of a rule of the Board of Police Commissioners and sought a
declaratory judgment that the rule was unconstitutional and an injunction restrain-
ing defendants from instituting disciplinary action against them. Although no action
had been taken against them at the time, the court held that the validity of the
rule could be determined.8 162 Kan. 588, 178 P.2d 261 (1947).
"°Williams v. State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 75 N.D. 33, 25 N.W.2d 282
(1946).
" Id. at 36, 25 N.W.2d at 284.
12 139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d 369 (1942).
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Plaintiffs contended that the court had jurisdiction to review under a
constitutional provision which provided that the court should have
"such revisory jurisdiction of the proceedings of administrative officers
as may be conferred by law."'1 3  The court held that "proceedings"
meant judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, pointing out that no
concrete application of the rule was involved in the case.
In Peters v. New York City Housing Authority1 4 the plaintiffs at-
tacked a resolution of the Housing Authority as unconstitutional and
sought to enjoin its enforcement. The resolution required residents of
federally-aided housing projects to sign a certificate of non-membership
in organizations designated as subversive by the Attorney General of
the United States. Those who refused were to be evicted. The cer-
tificates had been issued for signing but no further action had been
taken when petitioner brought the action. The New York Court of
Appeals refused to decide the case on the constitutional ground because
there were two other possible grounds of decision: (1) that the Au-
thority, in adopting the resolution, acted in excess of statutory authority;
and (2) that the resolution was an incorrect interpretation of the
statute. Since the lower courts had not considered these questions,
the court of appeals remitted the case to the special term for their de-
termination. In effect this amounted to a holding that the plaintiffs
could contest the resolution. 15
At least two states, Minnesota and New Jersey, have held that their
Declaratory Judgment Acts permit judicial review of administrative
regulations prior to their application to specific parties. In Minneapolis
Federation of Men Teachers v. Board of Educ.16 the defendant Board
passed a resolution requiring all teachers to sign a written contract for
the ensuing year. Some individual plaintiffs had acquired a tenure
status and objected to signing such a contract. They sought injunctive
relief to preserve the status quo of the parties before they were asked
to sign the contracts. The Board contended there was no justiciable
controversy. The court held the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory
judgment although no relief could be claimed beyond that of declaring
plaintiffs' rights so as to relieve the 'uncertainty. They had a judicially
protectible right that was being placed in jeopardy by the ripening seeds
of an actual controversy.
13 OHIO CONsT. art. IV, § 2 (1912).
14307 N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954).
But cf. Kent Stores, Inc. v. Murdock, 278 App. Div. 946, 105 N.Y.S.2d 111
(2d Dep't 1951). The facts of the case were not set out, but in a memorandum
decision the court said that the purpose of the proceeding was to obtain an opinion
essentially of an advisory nature and that neither the Board nor the courts had
jurisdiction to entertain such a proceeding.1238 Minn. 154, 56 N.W.2d 203 (1953).
1958]
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The New Jersey case of Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts17
involved a ruling by the Motor Fuels Tax Bureau to the effect that the
issuance of S & H discount stamps by gasoline retailers constituted a
violation of a statute. Plaintiff was in the business of licensing retailers
to use its stamps. The superior court held that plaintiff was entitled
to maintain the action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, saying that
there was a "concrete, contested issue" and that there existed a "justici-
able controversy." The supreme court affirmed' s without discussing the
right of plaintiffs to maintain the action.19
The Supreme Court 6f the United States has been increasingly lib-
eral in allowing judicial review of administrative regulations before their
application to definite parties in specific factual situations. A leading
case is Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States.20 The Federal
Communications Commission promulgated regulations which purported
to require the Commission to refuse to grant a license to any broad-
casting station which entered into certain defined types of contracts with
any broadcasting network organization. A supplemental "minute" of
the Commission allowed stations to contest the validity of the regula-
tions without danger of losing their licenses.
The complaint alleged that many stations, fearing the loss of their
licenses, were refusing to negotiate for or renew affiliation contracts
and threatened to cancel existing affiliation contracts containing the for-
bidden provisions, and that as a result plaintiff was going to suffer great
financial loss.
The Court held that the Commission's action was an "order" within
the meaning of section 402(a) of the Communications Act of 193421
and therefore reviewable under the Urgent Deficiences Act 22 and that
this plaintiff had stated a cause of action in equity. The theme of the
Court's reasoning was that in view of the irreparable injury with which
plaintiff was threatened the plaintiff's right to intervene in a proceeding
upon an application for a license by a station was not an adequate
remedy.
It should be noted that the regulations did not in terms apply to any
network and had not been applied to any station. The Court said that
these facts did not affect plaintiff's standing to maintain the suit in equity,
"'25 N.J. Super. 568, 96 A.2d 706 (Ch. 1953), aff'd, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A,2d
310 (1954).
1815 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310 (1954).
19 See Abelson's, Inc. v. New Jersey State Bd. of Optometrists, 19 N.J. Super.
408, 88 A.2d 632 (App. Div. 1952), which involved a regulation of the New Jersey
State Board of Optometrists. The plaintiff's right to contest the regulation was
not questioned, though it did not appear that the plaintiff had violated the regulation
or that the Board had taken steps to enforce it.20 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
2148 STAr. 1093 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1952).
2 38 STAT. 219, 220 (1913).
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that it was enough that the regulations purported to operate to alter and
affect adversely its contractual rights and business relations with station
owners.
Justice Frankfurter was joined by Justices Reed and Douglas in a
dissent based on the absence of any immediate, direct effect of the regu-
lations on the plaintiff or station owners. He distinguished the cases
relied on by the majority on the ground that in each of those cases
criminal prosecution, injunction, or fine could be used immediately to
enforce the command of the administrative agency. He was of the
opinion that even irreparable loss was not a sufficient ground for judicial
review.
23
Several cases decided since the CBS case have extended that de-
cision. In FCC v. American Broadcasting Co.2 4 the Supreme Court,
in a unanimous decision, did not consider or question the plaintiff's right
to sue to enjoin and have set aside regulations of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission which interpreted a statute prohibiting the broad-
casting of so-called "give away" programs. The Commission was to
refuse any station's application for a construction permit, license, etc.,
if it broadcast the forbidden programs. The plaintiff was a network
that made such programs available to stations for broadcast.
Under the Interstate Commerce Act carriers of agricultural com-
modities were exempt from the requirement of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity. Frozen Food Express v. United States25
was an action to enjoin and have set aside an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission that listed agricultural and nonagricultural com-
modities. Although the Interstate Commerce Act provided criminal
and other sanctions for violation of the act, the order did not command
compliance with the order or the act. The Commission merely threat-
ened to enjoin transportation of the commodities which plaintiff claimed
were agricultural. The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to main-
tain the action under the Administrative Procedure Act.26 The reason-
ing of the majority in the CBS case was relied upon in part.
The problem in Frozen Food Express closely parallels that in the
principal case, where the opposite result was reached. The Admin-
istrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review of any agency
action by any person suffering legal wrong or who is adversely affected
or aggrieved by such action.27 Agency action is defined to include
21 For a more exhaustive consideration of this and other cases and closely related
matters, see DAvis, ADMI1SWRATIVE LAW 640-63, 676-80 (1951); Davis, Ripe-
ness of Governmental Action for .udicial Review, 68 HARv. L. Rav. 1326 (1955).24347 U.S. 284 (1954).
25351 U.S. 40 (1956), 70 HARv. L. REv. 156 (1957).
21 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1952).
J60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952).
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agency rules and orders.2 8  The North Carolina statute29 provides for
judicial review at the instance of any person aggrieved by any final ad-
ministrative decision. "Administrative decision" is defined as any de-
cision, order, or determination rendered by an administrative agency
in a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of spe-
cific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined
after opportunity for agency hearing.3 0 "Administrative decision" as
thus defined appears to cover determinations which are judicial in nature
rather than regulations. 31
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.3 2 was decided a short time
after the Frozen Food Express case. The regulations in that case pro-
vided that licenses for broadcasting stations would not be granted if
the applicant had an interest in other stations beyond a limited number.
Plaintiff sought review under the Administrative Procedure Act8 3 and
the statute (hereafter referred to as section 1034) that was the successor
to the Urgent Deficiencies Act. 34  In holding that Storer had standing
to sue, the Court relied on the CBS, ABC, and Frozen Food Express
cases. The decision emphasized that "the Rules now operate to control
the business affairs of Storer.
'3 5
The Court cited the Administrative Procedure Act"0 for the proposi-
tion that this was final agency action and went on to justify review
under section 1034. justice Harlan dissented on the ground that Storer
was not a party "aggrieved" by a final "order" within the meaning of sec-
tion 1034. He did not discuss the review provisions of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.3 7  He distinguished the CBS holding that the chain
broadcasting regulations were an "order" on the basis of the "coercive
effect" of those regulations. He said: "The holding of the Court today
amounts to this: that regulations which impose no duty and determine no
rights may be reviewed at the instance of a person who alleges no in-
2860 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952).28N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-307 (Supp. 1957).
oNX.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-306 (Supp. 1957).
31 This conclusion seems to be strengthened by another factor. At the same
session and in successive chapters of the session laws, the legislature passed N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (1953) and N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150-9 to -34
(1953). The latter sections regulate licensing boards. G.S. § 150-32 provides
that one may petition for a declaratory judgment as to the validity of any
rule adopted by any of the boards covered by the statute when it appears thit the
rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to inter-
fere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner. The fact that
such provision was included in the latter act but not the former seems significant.
For an explanation of G.S. § 150-32, see JOENSTON, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEURE
124-26 (1953).
2 351 U.S. 192 (1956); 44 CALIF. L. REv. 938, 70 HARV. L. REv. 156 (1957).
"360 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1009(a), (c) (1952).
"64 STAT. 1130 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 1034 (1952).
35351 U.S. at 199.
"'60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001(c), (g) (1952).
8160 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952).
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jury, to settle whether a future application of the regulations that may
never occur would be valid."'38 This statement seems to be an accurate
appraisal of the decision.
The great difference in the position of the plaintiffs in the several
cases becomes obvious when one considers the possible harm that might
result to each while waiting for the regulations to be applied. The
CBS decision was based on the irreparable injury that plaintiff would
suffer by reason of contracts lost on account of the regulation.3 9 The
Storer case seemed to require no threat of irreparable injury in order
to justify judicial review of a regulation, but merely that the regulation
control the business affairs of the party seeking review. Thus the
Supreme Court has become increasingly liberal in allowing direct review
of administrative regulations without waiting for them to be applied.
The cases from the other states reveal that some of the successful
plaintiffs asked for an injunction or a declaratory judgment. No North
Carolina case was found in which the plaintiff asked for either of these
remedies in seeking review of an administrative regulation. The New
Jersey court granted relief to the Sperry & Hutchinson Company
40
under the New Jersey Declaratory judgment Act.41 The Minneapolis
Federation of Men Teachers 42 also got relief under the Minnesota act.43
The North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act44 does not differ in any
material particular from the acts of those states. It might be that a
contrary decision would have been reached if the plaintiff in the Duke
case had sought a declaratory judgment under the North Carolina act.
WILLIAM G. RANSSDELL, JR.
Constitutional Law-Congressional Investigations-
Contempt of Congress
Defendant, an instructor at Vassar College, was subpoenaed to
appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee and was
asked by the Committee a series of questions tending to elicit from him
whether he was or had been a member of the Communist Party and
whether he knew that one Crowley, who had identified defendant as a
member of a communist group while the latter was a student and in-
structor at the University of Michigan, had been a member of the
"351 U.S. at 212.
"See Justice Harlan's dissent in the Storer case, 351 U.S. at 211.Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 25 N.J. Super. 568, 96 A.2d 706 (Ch.
1953), aff'd, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310 (1954).
'
1N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :16-52 (1952).
"Minneapolis Federation of Men Teachers v. Board of Educ., 238 Minn. 154,
56 N.W.2d 203 (1953).
"MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 555.01-.15 (1947).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 and 1-256 (1953).
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